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Biodiversity Conservation Agreement

For the three scenarios with different natural conservation limits, we find that in the absence of transfers, the maximum size of a stable coalition is (s^{*} = 2). Regardless of their membership status (signatories or singletons), countries with a higher upper limit of maximum biodiversity retain a larger share of their foundation assets than others, as conservation becomes relatively cheaper. The inclusion of transfers has no impact on cooperation. Nevertheless, a transfer mechanism, such as a biodiversity market where conservation credits can be exchanged between coalition members, would allow countries with lower biodiversity endowments to transfer some of their conservation gains to countries with higher biodiversity endowments to ensure they are part of the agreement. Elmqvist, T. (2012). Perspectives on Cities and Biodiversity – Action and Policy. Montreal: Secretariat of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. Finally, the symmetric country hypothesis, often used in IEA models, is often too restrictive: the costs and benefits of biodiversity conservation vary considerably from country to country. Many countries that are well equipped in terms of biodiversity wealth are among the poorest in terms of income (Swanson and Groom 2012). In addition, the natural upper limit of nature conservation also differs from country to country. Some plans, such as ensuring proper conservation management or respecting indigenous rights, are too vague and open to interpretation, and there is no established way to link these global goals to national plans, they said.

Finus and Rübbelke (2013) integrate local (secondary) benefits into the standard two-stage cartel formation game of climate change. In one of their examples, they look at a payment function with linear local and global benefits and square costs. To explore the inclusion of the benefits of local biodiversity conservation in our model, we use the model of Finus and Rübbelke (2013) as a reference, but we use hyperbolic cost functions instead of the commonly used quadratic cost functions, as explained earlier. The disbursement function for Land i is as follows: Transfers between members of an IEA on biodiversity redistribute the benefits of cooperation and enable more effective coalitions in global nature conservation. A global biodiversity market could be an effective mechanism not only to increase global conservation, but also to determine where conservation is most effective and what characteristics potential members of an international biodiversity agreement should have. Finally, policymakers can consciously base treaty conceptions on asymmetries, i.e. on the specificities of different countries, especially when a transfer mechanism is implemented. Extensions of our model in future studies should take into account (1) the analysis of coalition stability in the context of multiple coalitions, (2) the inclusion of empirical results in the analysis, i.e.

the construction of a calibrated model, and (3) alternative hypotheses for our conservation approach. If we include double-sided asymmetry in the three-ke model, the largest stable coalition for the range of parameters considered (except for the change of (alpha)) remains equal to the symmetric model: (s^{*} = 2). The difference lies in the composition of stable coalitions. Stable coalitions are made up of countries with high benefits and low maintenance costs (type Bc). We also observe that, just as in the symmetrical case, cooperation between countries is positively linked to the increase in (alpha). In general, the stability of small coalitions and the instability of large coalitions may indicate that several partial agreements – composed of countries of the same type – could be more effective in terms of conservation outcomes than a single international agreement. We specify the global conservation G in our model as a parabolic function of Q to represent the subadditivity. However, other functional forms would also allow the inclusion of subadditivity in the model (e.B. a natural logarithmic function). The specification for global biodiversity conservation is as follows: There are 4,000 agreements in 19 countries around the world that benefit 30,000 people and protect 1.8 million hectares (4.4 million acres), an area slightly smaller than that of the state of New Jersey.

Of these agreements, 70% are directly funded and managed by government programs, and 30% are implemented by CI and partner organizations. In our analysis, we assume that all species have the same value to facilitate model evaluation. However, we recognize that this assumption is a simplification and therefore limits the political relevance of the results. This hypothesis has been discussed. For example, Brown and Shogren (1998) challenged the underlying arguments for the readmission of the Endangered Species Act, 1973 because it sought to save all species without distinguishing them when considering the relative benefits and costs of conservation. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the international legal instrument for « the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources » ratified by 196 countries. Countries with high benefits of biodiversity conservation and high costs for biodiversity protection (abbreviation BC), If the coalition member (j) leaves the coalition (S) in the first phase, the adjusted conservation levels are in the second stage: Of the more than 1,200 agreements implemented by CI and its partners, 90% focus on forest protection. An assessment of deforestation in areas where conservation agreements have been implemented for more than five years shows that there is three times less deforestation than in areas without conservation agreements. Our numerical analysis shows that the inclusion of subadditability in the overall biodiversity conservation function (G) allows for equilibrium coalitions greater than 2. Just as Barrett`s (1994) square-square model shows that larger coalitions are stable, our three-characteristic model allows coalitions greater than 2. The results of the scenarios suggest that Scenario II, including transfers, has the greatest potential benefits of cooperation and conservation. Even if the maximum size of a stable coalition does not change when transfers are included, all countries are willing to transfer a portion of their benefits individually to the country with the highest biodiversity endowment (C12) to ensure that it is part of a 2-member agreement.

Coalitions of 2 members, including C12, have the best payment in the world. Not surprisingly, we observe that trade is more efficient when the countries concerned are different. The inclusion of transfers in the two-sided asymmetry model systematically increases the size of stable coalitions. Transfers facilitate the realization of « profits of trade ». Low-conservation-cost countries receive compensation for their increased conservation efforts and therefore receive incentives to become signatories. In 2002, Conservation International negotiated an agreement in which the Government of Guyana granted CI a 30-year concession to protect 80,000 hectares (197,684 acres) for deforestation. The idea was repeated in Peru, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as it was an attractive deal for governments – which were compensated for the opportunity cost of land use planning – and a cost-effective way to preserve nature. « We`ve seen that there are usually community members in the first year of the agreement who don`t respect the agreement, » Mora says.

« By applying the penalties set out in the agreement, community members recognize that this is a serious relationship. » Our model shares some characteristics with a model developed by Winands et al. (2013), but differs in some important aspects. First of all, the specification of the model is different. While Winands et al. (2013) use a substitution constant elasticity utility function (CES) to account for different degrees of substitutability between ecosystems, we use a quadratic utility function to represent the subadjurisdictability aspect of global biodiversity conservation. Second, Winands et al. (2013) use protected hectares as a conservation measure, while we propose a species count. Third, the four country categories in our model differ from those presented in their study. In Winands et al. (2013) countries differ in two dimensions: the richness and richness of biodiversity, while the countries in our model differ in the benefits and costs of conservation.

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